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A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S NEW
APPROACH TO MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Robert A. Mikos*
INTRODUCTION
The Obama Administration has embarked upon a much-heralded shift in
federal policy toward medical marijuana. Eschewing the hardball tactics
favored by earlier administrations, Attorney General Eric Holder announced in
October 2009 that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would stop enforcing the
federal marijuana ban against persons who comply with state medical
marijuana laws.
On the surface, the Non-Enforcement Policy (NEP) signals a welcome
reprieve for the more than 400,000 people now using marijuana legally under
state law and the thousands more who supply them. Under the Clinton and
George W. Bush administrations, the DOJ had campaigned vigorously against
medical marijuana programs. For example, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) raided hundreds of medical marijuana dispensaries and
threatened to derail the careers of physicians who recommended marijuana to
their patients. Under the Obama Administration, it would seem, patients,
physicians, and dispensaries can breathe a lot easier.
What is more, the NEP appears to cede an important policy domain to the
states. Medical marijuana has been one of the most salient and contentious
federalism battlegrounds of the past fifteen years. Federal officials have railed
against the intransigence of the states; state officials have protested
overreaching by the national government; and the Supreme Court has twice
weighed in to settle jurisdictional disputes over the drug. The NEP seemingly
calls a truce in this war, but its impact could extend more broadly. The states'
pioneering efforts regarding medical marijuana have already fueled calls for
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even more ambitious drug law reforms, including proposals to legalize
marijuana outright. The NEP could bolster calls for reform and accelerate the
pace of change.
Given the significance of the medical marijuana issue in both criminal law
and federalism circles, this Article sets out to provide the first in-depth analysis
of the changes wrought by the NEP. In a nutshell, the Article suggests that
early enthusiasm for the NEP is misguided; on close inspection, the NEP
represents at most a very modest change in federal policy. To begin, the Article
suggests that the NEP will not necessarily stop federal law enforcement agents
from pursuing criminal prosecutions. In a twist of irony, the non-enforcement
policy itself is not enforceable. It does not create any legal rights a court could
invoke to dismiss a criminal case. Even the DOJ will have a difficult time
ensuring that federal prosecutors comply with the agency's own stated policy.
Even assuming the NEP ends all criminal prosecutions against state-law-
abiding dispensaries and users, federal law could still obstruct state medical
marijuana programs by imposing-or allowing others to impose-a wide range
of civil and private sanctions on medical marijuana users and suppliers. At
bottom, the problem is that the NEP does not repeal the federal ban on
marijuana-marijuana technically remains illegal under federal law and that
ban triggers a host of civil sanctions on top of the criminal sanctions controlled
by the DOJ. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) can deny federal housing subsidies to medical marijuana users, and
pharmaceutical companies could potentially bring civil RICO actions against
marijuana dispensaries. What is more, the federal ban arguably preempts states
from shielding marijuana users and dispensaries from sanctions imposed by
private parties. For example, as long as marijuana remains illegal under federal
law, employers can likely avoid liability under state law for discriminating
against employees who use the drug for medical purposes. Metaphorically, the
federal ban is a hydra, only one head of which has been severed by the NEP
(and one that could too easily be regrown). The labor of ending federal
prohibition is not yet complete.
I do not mean to overstate the threat federal law poses to the medical
marijuana movement. As I have argued elsewhere, the federal government lost
the war against medical marijuana long before the NEP.1 It never had enough
law enforcement resources to quash medical marijuana on its own, and it could
not compel the states' assistance. "Medical marijuana use . .. survived and
indeed thrived in the shadow of the federal ban."2 The question now is whether
the federal government will allow the states to construct a sensible regulatory
regime free of federal interference or whether it will instead wage an ongoing
guerilla-style campaign against medical marijuana-one with many casualties,
1. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marguana and the States'
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1421, 1464-68 (2009).
2. Id. at 1482.
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but with no real victory possible.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some background on
medical marijuana laws, state and federal. It also details the NEP and the
apparent shift in federal enforcement policy. Part II explains why the NEP does
not necessarily preclude federal criminal prosecutions, even when defendants
faithfully comply with state law. Part III then discusses other civil sanctions
that could still be levied against medical marijuana dispensaries and users. It
also examines the possibility that certain state laws that purport to shield
marijuana users and suppliers from private sanctions could be successfully
challenged as preempted.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides a brief introduction to federal and state medical
marijuana laws and enforcement practices. 3 Subpart A discusses the substance
of federal and state law. Subpart B details the federal law enforcement response
to state medical marijuana programs under the Clinton and George W. Bush
administrations. Subpart C then discusses the details of the Obama
Administration's apparent change in course, embodied in the NEP.
A. Marijuana Law
Since the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was passed in 1970, the federal
government has banned the possession, cultivation, and distribution of
marijuana.4 Violations of the ban can trigger harsh criminal and civil sanctions,
especially for trafficking offenses.5
Federal law does not distinguish between medicinal and recreational uses
of marijuana: both are forbidden. Lawmakers have repeatedly rebuffed
campaigns to reschedule marijuana under the CSA, a step that would pennit
marijuana to be used for some medical purposes.6 Likewise, courts have
refused to carve out exceptions to the CSA, even for individuals who claim a
dire need for the drug.7
3. See id. at 1427-36 (providing a more in-depth discussion of state and federal medical
marijuana laws and enforcement practices).
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2006).
5. Id. See also Mikos, supra note 1, at 1435 (discussing sanctions imposed under the
CSA).
6. See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1434-35 (discussing failed legislative and administrative
proposals to reschedule marijuana at the federal level).
7. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001)
(concluding that the terms of the CSA "leave no doubt that the [medical necessity] defense is
unavailable" under the statute, given Congress's necessary determination that "marijuana has
no medical benefits worthy of an exception"). President Jimmy Carter did create a
compassionate use program in 1978 which allowed enrolled individuals to use marijuana
legally for therapeutic purposes. That program, however, has enrolled only thirty-six
635
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Despite the federal government's steadfast opposition to recognizing
marijuana as medicine, a large and growing number of states have reformed
their own laws regarding medical marijuana. Starting with California in 1996,
fifteen states have now legalized medical marijuana under state law.8
The particulars of these state laws vary, but as a general matter, all of them
permit a resident to possess, consume, and grow marijuana by obtaining a
qualifying diagnosis and recommendation from a board-licensed physician.
Most states have also adopted regulations to help curb abuses of the laws. For
example, states require physicians to conduct a bona fide medical examination
before recommending marijuana to a patient.9 Every state except California
requires that recommendation to be in writinglo-in California, an oral
recommendation will do.'1 In twelve states, an agency must review the
diagnosis and recommendation before a patient may begin treatment. 12 And
every state except-you guessed it, California-limits the quantity of
marijuana that qualified patients may legally possess at one time.1
A handful of states also permit third-party vendors to supply marijuana to
qualified patients.14 Regulations on the operation of such dispensaries vary
widely across states and even within individual states. For example, some states
restrict the compensation that dispensaries may receive for providing
marijuana.15 Some states also limit the number of patients that each dispensary
may serve.16 California requires patients to form cooperatives and permits these
participants since its inception, and it stopped admitting new participants under the George
H. W. Bush Administration. See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1433 (discussing program).
8. California (1996); Oregon (1998); Washington (1998); Alaska (1999); Maine
(1999); Colorado (2000); Hawaii (2000); Montana (2004); Nevada (2004); Vermont (2004);
Rhode Island (2006); New Mexico (2007); Michigan (2008); New Jersey (2009); and
Arizona (2010).
9. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.010(c) (2010).
10. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.010 (2010).
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 2010) (requiring the "written or
oral recommendation or approval of a physician").
12. E.g., N.M. CODER. §§ 7.34.3.3, 7.34.3.9 (LexisNexis 2010).
13. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 22, § 2383-A (2009) (stating that a patient may possess up
to 2.5 ounces of usable marijuana and six plants). The California Supreme Court recently
invalidated (modest) legislatively-imposed quantity limitations. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d
186, 196 (Cal. 2010).
14. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 475.304 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(F) (West
2010) ("A licensed producer shall not be subject to arrest, prosecution or penalty, in any
manner, for the production, possession, distribution or dispensing of cannabis pursuant to the
... Compassionate Use Act.").
15. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.304 (2010) (stating that growers may be reimbursed only for
the cost of materials and utility bills, and not their labor); N.M. CODE R. § 7.34.4.8
(LexisNexis 2010) (requiring that licensed growers be non-profit and not provide volume
discounts).
16. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.320(2)(c) (2010) (requiring that each grower may serve at
most only four qualified patients).
[Vol. 22:2636
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cooperative dispensaries to supply only cooperative members.' 7 Few states
have yet adopted comprehensive regulations of dispensaries, but local
governments have increasingly sought to fill in the regulatory gaps. Many local
communities have imposed zoning and licensing requirements on marijuana
dispensaries.' 8 A few have even sought to banish dispensaries from their
jurisdictions. 9
States also purport to shield patients, physicians, and dispensaries from
sanctions that could otherwise be imposed by private actors. For example,
every state bars licensing boards, hospitals, and other health-care entities from
20sanctioning physicians for recommending marijuana to their patients. A few
states also shield tenants from being evicted for possessing, using, or
cultivating marijuana on rental property.21 And a few states are now seeking to
bar employers from discriminating against employees who use marijuana
legally under state law. 22
B. The Early Federal Response to State Medical Marijuana Laws
The federal government responded swiftly to the passage of the first state
23medical marijuana law in California in 1996. In February 1997, the Clinton
Administration's drug czar, former General Barry McCaffrey, issued a harsh
statement outlining the steps the federal government would take to thwart the
24nascent medical marijuana movement. Among other things, McCaffrey
threatened to vigorously prosecute persons who supplied medical marijuana,
revoke the prescription writing authority of physicians who recommended
marijuana to patients, and deny various federal benefits (including licenses) to
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.765 (West 2010) (exempting cooperatives
that grow marijuana on behalf of qualified patients from legal sanctions).
18. E.g., Ams. for Safe Access v. City of Los Angeles, No. BC433942 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Dec. 10, 2010) (unpublished) (discussing-and enjoining-restrictions imposed by the city
of Los Angeles).
19. E.g., John Hoeffel, Medical Marijuana Case Appears Headed Back to Trial, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010, 6:08 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/12/medical-
marijuana-case-appears-headed-back-to-trial.html (discussing legal challenge to Anaheim's
ban on medical marijuana dispensaries).
20. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030(c) (2010) (providing that a physician shall not be
subjected to any sanction for recommending marijuana); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 329-121, 329-
123(c) (2010) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.5 1A.030 (2010) (same).
21. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 90.396(1)(f)(B)(i) (2010).
22. E.g., S.B. 129, 2011-12 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ 1-12/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/
sb 129 bill 20110127 introduced.html (proposing to ban employment discrimination
against medical marijuana users in California).
23. See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1463-69 (providing a more complete discussion of the
federal response to state medical marijuana laws).
24. Administrative Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition
215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
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anyone who used marijuana pursuant to California law.25
The campaign against medical marijuana continued throughout the George
W. Bush Administration. U.S. Attorneys prosecuted several high-profile
medical marijuana suppliers.2 6 The DEA employed an arsenal of weapons
against medical marijuana dispensaries, which had begun to proliferate in
California (and elsewhere). For example, the DEA conducted nearly two
hundred raids on medical marijuana dispensaries in California alone,2 7 and it
warned landlords that it would seize their property if they did not immediately
evict marijuana-dispensing tenants. 28
Stymied in their efforts to reschedule marijuana or at least suspend
enforcement of the federal ban, medical marijuana proponents turned to the
federal courts for protection. Invoking the rights of the states and of the people,
proponents hoped to overturn--or at least narrow the application of-the
federal marijuana ban. But when the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue, it
repeatedly upheld the federal government's power to prosecute persons caught
possessing, growing, or distributing marijuana for medical purposes. In United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, for example, the Court
rejected the medical necessity defense of a city-licensed medical marijuana
dispensary.29 In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court declared that Congress could
regulate even the non-commercial, intra-state cultivation and consumption of
marijuana.30 These decisions left no doubt that the federal government could
continue to sanction anyone who cultivated, distributed, or possessed
marijuana.
C. The Obama Non-Enforcement Policy (NEP)
In 2009, however, the Obama Administration broke with its predecessors
and announced a new federal policy toward medical marijuana-a policy to
cease DOJ enforcement of the federal ban. The new NEP was formally
promulgated in an October 2009 memorandum to U.S. Attorneys from Deputy
Attorney General David Ogden. 31 The memorandum urged federal prosecutors
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Pot Advocate Gets 1 Day in Jail and Gives Judge a Piece of
His Mind, S.F. CHRON., July 7, 2007, at B3 (detailing Bush 1I Administration's prosecution
of Ed Rosenthal, the so-called guru of ganga).
27. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS, at Sl
(2008), available at http://docs.mpp.org/pdfs/download-materials/SBSRNOV2008 1.pdf.
28. Wyatt Buchanan, Pot Dispensaries Shut in Response to Federal Threat, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 7, 2008, at BI (reporting that DEA had recently warned dispensary landlords
that they could face forfeiture and possible criminal sanctions for renting property to drug
cooperatives).
29. 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001).
30. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
31. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Selected U.S.
Attorneys (Oct 19, 2009) [hereinafter "NEP Memorandum"], available at
[Vol. 22:2638
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not to enforce the federal marijuana ban against persons who act in "clear and
unambiguous compliance" with state medical marijuana laws. 32 Ogden
simultaneously affirmed the Administration's commitment to the war on drugs;
the memorandum, for example, urges U.S. Attorneys to continue to target
"significant traffickers" of illegal narcotics and "manufacturing and distribution
networks." But he suggested that prosecuting medical marijuana defendants
was not the most efficient use of the federal government's scarce capacity to
wage that war.
At first glance, the NEP seemingly represents a ground-breaking shift in
federal drug policy-and much commentary welcomed it as such.34 It appears
to suspend the federal government's longstanding campaign against medical
marijuana. Indeed, it represents only the first time since the ban was adopted
that the federal government has explicitly renounced enforcement, albeit only
against persons who use the drug pursuant to state law.
Ultimately, the success of the policy can only be measured against its chief
objectives. First, the NEP is designed to reprioritize the use of the federal
government's scarce criminal justice resources. One could say that it does not
constitute an endorsement of medical marijuana. Instead, it merely reflects the
http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192. The full text of the memorandum appears in the
Appendix to this Article.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. For commentary on the NEP, see, for example, Editorial, Medical Marituana's
Merit: Obama Administration's Policy Change Is Right Call, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
26, 2009, at A12 ("[The NEP memorandum] reverses longstanding federal policy and marks
a step toward separating those who could be helped by marijuana's therapeutic properties
from those who criminally distribute or use it."); Editorial, Good Sense on Medical
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at A30 ("Attorney General Eric Holder Jr. has made
the right decision, calling off prosecutions of patients who use marijuana for medical
purposes or those who distribute it to them-provided they comply with state law. It is a
welcome reversal of the Bush administration's ideologically driven campaign to prosecute
dispensaries."); Christopher Beam, Will Obama's New Medical Marituana Directive
Actually Change Anything?, SLATE (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2232915/
(suggesting the NEP will end federal prosecutions of medical marijuana dispensaries); Chris
Weigant, Holder's Baby Step on Medical Marituana, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/holders-baby-step-on-medi_b_326603.html
(calling the NEP a "historic shift in the War on Drugs," but one that "does not go far
enough"). Commentators had similar reactions to earlier statements made by the Obama
Administration suggesting the DOJ would suspend raids of medical marijuana dispensaries.
E.g., Ryan Grim, Holder Vows to End Raids on Medical Marijuana Clubs, HUFFINGTON
PoST (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/26/holder-vows-to-end-
raids_n 170119.html (suggesting that the decision to no longer conduct raids "marks a major
shift from the previous administration"); Josh Meyer & Scott Glover, Medical Marijuana
Dispensaries Will No Longer Be Prosecuted, U.S. Attorney General Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/19/local/me-medpotl9 (reporting how policy
advocates viewed statements as a "sweeping change in federal drug policy" and a "landmark
turnaround" from the approach of the George W. Bush Administration).
35. NEP Memorandum, supra note 31.
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new Administration's belief that federal law enforcement resources could be
better spent enforcing other federal criminal laws (e.g., terrorism crimes).
Second, the NEP is also designed to empower state governments to regulate
medical marijuana according to local preferences. It implicitly recognizes that
some states do not share the federal government's hostility toward marijuana.
And while it does not legalize medical marijuana under federal law, it does
seemingly allow these states to do so under state law--ostensibly free of the
obstacles imposed by prior administrations. To users and their suppliers, then,
the NEP is arguably as good as federal legalization, at least in states that allow
the drug.
The next two Parts analyze the NEP against these dual objectives. I
ultimately conclude that the NEP does not accomplish either goal satisfactorily.
In Part II, I explain why the NEP does not necessarily stop federal law
enforcement agents from pursuing criminal prosecutions. And in Part 1II, I
explain why the NEP does not clear away all of the legal obstacles confronting
state medical marijuana programs. In short, the NEP is a step-but only a very
small one.
II. THE NEP AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The NEP is intended to curb criminal prosecutions of medical marijuana
dispensaries that comply with state law. I argue, however, that the NEP will not
necessarily accomplish this goal. Subpart A explains that the NEP does not
create any legally enforceable rights that a court could use to dismiss a criminal
prosecution brought by non-conforming federal agents. Subpart B then explains
that the NEP also will not necessarily deter federal agents from pursuing such
prosecutions, because the DOJ's power to detect and sanction non-compliance
with its own policy is quite limited.
A. The Legal Impact of the NEP
The NEP does not create a legal defense to a CSA violation. No defendant
could cite the policy as the basis for dismissing a criminal prosecution brought
by the United States.
First, by its own terms, the NEP does not create any legally enforceable
rights. Indeed, an entire paragraph of the NEP Memorandum is devoted to
debunking any claim to a legal defense based on the NEP. It reads, in relevant
part:
This guidance regarding resource allocation does not "legalize"
marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor
is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable by any individual, party or witness in any
administrative, civil, or criminal matter. Nor does clear and
unambiguous compliance with state law . .. create a legal defense to a
violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum
[Vol. 22:2640
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is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and
prosecutorial discretion 36
To be sure, a handful of defendants facing federal charges have sought to
dismiss their prosecutions by invoking the NEP Memorandum and related
statements made by Attorney General Holder and President (or candidate)
Obama. But the lower federal courts have uniformly rejected NEP-based
defenses, at least in part by invoking the language of the NEP itself."
Second, even assuming the NEP more plainly and forcefully sought to
foreclose prosecutions, there's arguably nothing that a federal court (or
criminal defendant) could do to enforce it against the DOJ. In fact, one court
has already ruled that the NEP would be unenforceable on separation of powers
grounds, even assuming that its language had more plainly sought to bar the
prosecution of the defendant at hand.3
The federal courts have consistently refused to dismiss criminal
prosecutions on the basis of violations of similar DOJ internal guidelines. 39 The
courts' treatment of the DOJ's Petite Policy, which precludes initiation of a
federal prosecution "following a prior state or federal prosecution based on
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s)," exemplifies the point.40 Like the
NEP, the Petite Policy contains language explicitly denying that it creates any
legally enforceable rights,41 and "[a]ll of the federal circuit courts that have
considered the question have held that a criminal defendant can not invoke
the . . .policy as a bar to federal prosecution."42
Third, a defendant would fare no better by reframing the argument as an
36. Id.
37. E.g., United States v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148-49 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that the NEP did not bar criminal prosecution of defendant for distributing medical
marijuana commercially).
38. Id. at 1149 ("Even if Defendant's prosecution were contrary to the guidance set
forth in the [NEP] Memorandum, dismissal of the Indictment would not be warranted.
Defendant has not pointed to any authority for dismissing an indictment because it is
contrary to internal Department of Justice guidelines.").
39. For an excellent analysis of litigation over DOJ guidelines, see Ellen S. Podgor,
Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice ", 13 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 167 (2003) (finding variety of internal DOJ guidelines, including the Petite
Policy, unenforceable).
40. The Petite Policy is outlined in the US. Attorneys' Manual. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/
title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.03 1.
41. Id. § 9-2.031(F).
42. Id. See also NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 107 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that "[d]efendants have alleged Petite violations in
many cases, and the courts have universally refused to grant relief."). The courts have
refused to enforce the Petite Policy against U.S. Attorneys because of (1) the express
language in the policy rejecting its enforceability, (2) separation of powers concerns, and (3)
the lack of judicially manageable guidelines for determining whether criteria for making
exceptions to the policy have been satisfied. Id.
641
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entrapment by estoppel defense.43 The entrapment by estoppel defense is based
on the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, so it arguably mitigates the
separation of powers concerns cited by courts in refusing to enforce internal
DOJ guidelines. The NEP, however, does not support the defense.
To prevail on the defense, a defendant must show that she reasonably
relied upon an official, albeit erroneous, interpretation of federal criminal law
when committing a federal offense." To illustrate, suppose Attorney General
Holder had issued a memorandum opinion declaring the following:
Upon careful review of the relevant statutes, regulations, legislative
history, and judicial decisions, I have determined that federal law does
not proscribe the cultivation, distribution, or possession of marijuana
for medical purposes.
This would be an erroneous interpretation of the CSA: the statute proscribes the
aforementioned activities. Nonetheless, a defendant could arguably assert a
valid defense against marijuana charges, as long as she had reasonably and in
good faith relied upon the statement when committing her offense.
The actual NEP issued by the DOJ, however, does not constitute an official
statement of law, reliance on which would excuse criminal conduct. It is
guidance regarding how the DOJ will enforce the law, not a declaration of what
the law means.45 Governments cannot retroactively change the meaning of
criminal statutes, at least to the detriment of defendants. Doing so runs afoul of
the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. However, governments can change
enforcement practices at will-increasing or reducing the probability of
detecting, charging, prosecuting, and sanctioning violations of the law,
including past violations. 46 Official statements about enforcement practices do
not bind law enforcement officials; they do not create a valid legal defense.4 7
43. At least one defendant has attempted to raise an entrapment by estoppel defense
based on campaign statements made by Barack Obama that laid the foundation for the NEP.
United States v. Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1077-81 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (rejecting the
defendant's assertion of the defense).
44. See United States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a defense of entrapment by estoppel is established when the defendant shows
"that the government affirmatively told him the proscribed conduct was permissible, and that
he reasonably relied on the government's statement"); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59,
83 (2d Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 487 (1967) ("Ordinarily,
citizens may not be punished for actions undertaken in good faith reliance upon authoritative
assurance that punishment will not attach."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)
(dismissing indictment of demonstrators because the police had assured them their planned
demonstration location did not violate city ordinance).
45. See Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (rejecting entrapment by estoppel defense based
on statements made by President Obama, because "there is still no affirmative statement that
Defendant's conduct is lawful under federal law").
46. Cf id. ("A reasonable belief that one will not be prosecuted is not the same thing as
a reasonable belief that one's actions do not violate federal law.").
47. On top of this seemingly insurmountable legal flaw with the entrapment by
estoppel defense, it would be next to impossible for any criminal defendant to prove she
reasonably relied upon the NEP in distributing (possessing, etc.) marijuana. Marijuana is
[Vol. 22:2642
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The distinction between statements interpreting the law and statements
outlining enforcement practices is highly formalistic-and one could argue that
both types of statements should be treated alike. The distinction, however, is
entrenched in extant doctrine, and, barring a major shift in jurisprudence, it
dooms any entrapment by estoppel defense based on the NEP.
In short, the NEP does not create a valid legal defense to a criminal
marijuana charge under federal law.
B. The Practical Impact of the NEP
Of course, one might expect the DOJ to heed its own policy, in which case
judicial enforcement of the NEP would be unnecessary. In reality, however, the
DOJ is a fragmented agency, one in which several autonomous decision-
makers help shape enforcement policy. U.S. Attorneys in particular have
tremendous power over federal criminal law enforcement and a great deal of
independence from the DOJ in Washington. As a formal matter, it is the U.S.
Attomeys-and not the DOJ in Washington-that decide what charges (if any)
to bring in criminal cases. And not all U.S. Attorneys necessarily support the
decrees emanating from Washington.
To be sure, the DOJ wields some practical influence over charging
decisions, and, in theory, it could use that influence to encourage U.S.
48Attorneys to abide by the NEP. Perhaps most importantly, U.S. Attorneys are
nominated by the President4 9 and are thus likely to share the President's vision
of federal criminal justice, including the President's views concerning the
wisdom of criminally prosecuting medical marijuana cases. In any event, the
President may always remove a U.S. Attorney who disregards DOJ policy.50
Indeed, as the Office of Inspector General recently explained, "U.S. Attorneys
are Presidential appointees who may be dismissed for any reason or for no
reason."51 The Attorney General can also encourage compliance, for example,
clearly an illicit drug under federal law, and nothing in the NEP purports to change that
status.
48. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 42, at 110-12 (discussing DOJ control over U.S.
Attorneys); JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE
POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978) (examining the relationship between U.S. Attorneys
and the DOJ).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
50. Id. See also Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (upholding the
President's unfettered removal power).
51. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, at 330
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf. See also id at
335 ("It is the President's and the Department's prerogative to remove a U.S. Attorney who
they believe is not adhering to their priorities or not adequately pursuing the types of
prosecutions that the Department chooses to emphasize.").
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by removing Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) who disregard DOJ policy52 or
by slashing the budgets of non-conforming districts.5 3 She can even (arguably)
move to vacate convictions she believes were obtained in violation of DOJ
policy.54
Generally speaking, these tools give the DOJ some leverage over charging
decisions. For purposes of enforcing the NEP, however, they are largely
unavailing, because the DOJ cannot easily monitor compliance with that
policy.55 The NEP discourages employees from prosecuting defendants who
have complied with state law, but determining whether any given defendant has
actually done so proves remarkably difficult, for several reasons. First, some
defendants operate in a legal vacuum. Many states have neglected to address
such rudimentary issues as how patients are supposed to obtain marijuana
legally and who may supply it to them.56 Hence, it may be an open question
whether a particular defendant (say, a dispensary) is operating in compliance
with state law. Second, even if an authoritative regulation exists, it could prove
extremely difficult to find. State medical marijuana laws are a mash-up of
referenda approved by the voters, statutes passed by state legislatures,
regulations issued by state agencies, ordinances passed by local governments,
and judicial interpretations of all of the above. Third, complicating matters,
some state and local laws are of dubious legal status. The California Supreme
Court, for example, has invalidated portions of a state statute (S.B. 420)" that
imposed modest restrictions on medical marijuana (e.g., limits on the quantity
of marijuana patients could legally possess).s Similarly, lower state courts
52. 28 U.S.C. § 542 (2006). Short of removal, the Attorney General may instead
reprimand or suspend Assistant U.S. Attorneys. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note
40, §§ 3-4.752.
53. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 757, 781 (1999).
54. See Podgor, supra note 39, at 189-90 (noting that courts permit the DOJ to correct
its mistakes).
55. Various auditing and reporting requirements normally help the Attorney General to
monitor compliance with DOJ policies. See Tom Rickoff, The U.S. Attorney: Fateful,
Powers Limited, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 499, 504-05 (1997).
56. Mikos, supra note 1, at 1431 ("Although states have adopted fairly detailed
regulations specifying who may possess and use marijuana, they have been far more
circumspect regarding how qualified patients are actually supposed to acquire marijuana in
the first instance and far more reticent to shield marijuana suppliers from state sanctions. In
the vast majority of states, there is simply no legal way for qualified patients to obtain usable
marijuana or even the plants or seeds needed to grow their own supply."); see also David
Harrison, The Buying and Selling of Legal Marituana, STATELINE (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.stateline.org/liveldetails/story?contentld=511628 (noting that state laws are
poorly written and fail to provide clear legal avenues by which patients may legally obtain
marijuana for medical use).
57. S.B. 420, 2002-03 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
58. E.g., People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 196 (Cal. 2010) (holding that legislated
quantity limits constituted unconstitutional amendment of 1996 referendum because the
original law passed by the voters imposed none).
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have recently enjoined enforcement of local ordinances that restricted the
number and location of medical marijuana dispensaries.5 9 Given the uncertain
status of such regulations, the DOJ cannot easily discern whether the
prosecution of someone who violated one of them constitutes a breach of the
NEP. Fourth, even when the legal rules are clear, determining whether a given
defendant has complied with them may be impractical. For example, a state
might criminalize the sale of marijuana to anyone other than a qualified patient,
but there may be no easy, reliable way to determine who is a qualified patient.
In states like California, where patients are not required to register or even
obtain a physician's recommendation in writing, judging whether a dispensary
has complied with such restrictions in any given transaction could be
enormously time-consuming.
These factors make it unlikely that the DOJ can accurately gauge whether
any given medical marijuana prosecution brought by a U.S. Attorney was
warranted by the NEP. Indeed, for similar reasons, the U.S. Attorney would
find it a challenge to follow the policy in good faith. And if the DOJ is unable
to gauge compliance with the NEP, it cannot credibly pressure U.S. Attorneys
to adhere to the policy.
Moreover, even if President Obama is able to constrain U.S. Attorneys
from pursuing medical marijuana cases during his administration, nothing
about the NEP bars the next administration from reviving such prosecutions,
even if the charged violations took place during the Obama Administration. As
explained above, no defendant could cite the NEP to block prosecution. If, for
example, President Obama is defeated by a more hawkish Republican
contender in 2012, any drug offense committed during his four-year
administration could be prosecuted by the new President's U.S. Attorneys-the
statute of limitations on federal drug charges is five years long. And even if
President Obama is reelected, any offense committed after 2011 could be
prosecuted by the next administration. In other words, even if the DOJ has
severed the head of the prohibition hydra that represents criminal prosecutions,
that head could be regrown, with no more than the press of the delete button.
The same problems would not arise if President Obama had taken a
different, bolder step: legalizing marijuana. As discussed in the Conclusion, the
CSA empowers the Attorney General to reschedule, and thereby, to legalize,
marijuana. Of course, the next President could undo that change; but for
reasons discussed above, she could not apply it retroactively-namely, to
marijuana "offenses" that occurred before the drug was "recriminalized."
In sum, the NEP may not have much influence over criminal prosecutions
59. E.g., Ams. for Safe Access v. City of Los Angeles, No. BC433942 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://americansforsafeaccess.org/
downloads/LA_1njunction.pdf (granting preliminary injunction against city ordinance that
sought to limit the number of marijuana dispensaries operating in Los Angeles).
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brought by U.S. Attorneys. It is not a legally enforceable policy. No court
would block a federal criminal prosecution on its account. The NEP might
pressure U.S. Attorneys to curtail medical marijuana prosecutions, but it is too
anemic to stop them altogether. Indeed, perhaps most tellingly, it appears that
federal agents continue to raid medical marijuana dispensaries and prosecute
medical marijuana cases, much as they did before non-enforcement became
the DOJ's official policy.
III. THE NEP AND CIVIL ACTIONS
The NEP only constrains officials in the DOJ. It does not bind federal
officials in other executive branch agencies, nor does it bind state officials or
private citizens. Although these other actors are not authorized to bring
criminal prosecutions under the CSA, they could pursue civil actions to
sanction marijuana users/dispensaries and disrupt state programs. This Part
considers the merits of three such actions: (1) civil sanctions imposed by
agencies outside of the DOJ; (2) civil RICO actions; and (3) preemption
challenges brought by private citizens and state officials that challenge state
participation in marijuana programs or state protection from private sanctions.
It also examines who would have standing to bring the civil RICO actions and
preemption challenges.
A. Civil Sanctions Imposed by Agencies Outside DOJ
Federal law gives the DOJ exclusive authority to criminally prosecute
violators of the federal marijuana ban. However, it empowers other federal
agencies to withhold benefits from and impose harsh civil sanctions on
60. See Robert J. Corry, Jr., The Audacity of Dope: Obama Breaks Medical Maryuana
Promise, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-j-corry-
jr/wont-get-fooled-again-oba b_758389.html (detailing recent DEA raids on medical
marijuana dispensaries in Colorado); Kris Hermes, Has the Federal Government Changed
Its Policy on Medical Mariuana Enforcement or Just Changed Its Reasons for Continued
Interference?, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:22 AM),
http://safeaccessnow.org/blog/?p=1228 (reporting that DEA has conducted at least forty-
three raids of medical marijuana dispensaries in California, Colorado, Michigan, and Nevada
since promulgating the NEP in October 2009); cf Michael Montgomery, Obama
Administration Warns Oakland on Pot Farms, CALIFORNIA WATCH (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://califomiawatch.org/ dailyreport/obama-administration-wams-oakland-pot-farms-7234
(detailing federal threats against city-licensed medical marijuana dispensaries).
61. A suit based on 21 U.S.C. § 841 would likely be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, because it does not provide for causes of action brought by non-federal actors. See,
e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (noting that private citizens cannot
compel enforcement of criminal law; holding that physician lacked standing to enforce
abortion ban); Tesi v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 4:10-CV-272-Y, 2010 WL 2293177, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2010) ("Generally, a criminal statute does not provide a basis for civil
liability and a private citizen has no standing to enforce a criminal statute.").
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marijuana users.62 Just as importantly, the NEP does not suspend enforcement
of these actions.
For example, federal law bars anyone who uses illicit drugs from serving in
various safety-sensitive transportation positions, ranging from bus driver to
flight instructor.6 3 Strict compliance with state law does not shield medical
marijuana users from the sanction.64 In fact, soon after the NEP was formally
announced, the Department of Transportation (DOT) made it clear that the
"DOJ guidelines will have no bearing on the Department of Transportation's
regulated drug testing program."65
Similarly, federal law prohibits anyone who uses illicit drugs from
receiving federal housing assistance. 6 The Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) requires public housing agencies (PHAs) to deny
admission to new applicants who violate the drug policy.67 It also authorizes
(though does not require) PHAs to evict current tenants who violate the
policy.68 Like the DOT, HUD has refused to suspend enforcement of the
sanction against marijuana users who obey state law.69
As a final example, federal law bars "unlawful user[s] of .. .any controlled
substance" from possessing firearms.70 The law makes no exception for
62. Indeed, at the outset of the medical marijuana movement, the federal government
adopted a strategy that expressly called upon a diverse array of federal agencies-including
the DOJ, the Internal Revenue Service, Customs, the Postal Service, the Department of
Transportation, the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Labor, among
others-to quash state medical marijuana programs. Administrative Response to Arizona
Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997)
(outlining strategy).
63. 49 U.S.C. § 5331 (2006).
64. Id. § 5331(f).
65. Notice from Jim Swart, Dir., Office of Drug & Alcohol Policy & Compliance, to
Emp's of U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/
documents/Medical-Marijuana-Notice.pdf.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2006).
67. 24 C.F.R. § 5.854(b) (2010).
68. Id. § 5.858 (2010).
69. Letter from Gail Laster, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to
William C. Apgar, Assistant Sec'y, Office of Hous./Fed. Hous. Comm'r (Sept. 24, 1999).
HUD encourages landlords to review medical marijuana infractions on a case-by-case basis
before pursuing eviction. Id. at 8-9 (outlining factors to be considered in eviction
determination). See also Jessica Dyer, Medical Pot User Can Keep Housing Subsidy,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 25, 2010 (reporting that public housing authority in New Mexico
spared medical marijuana user from termination of Section 8 housing subsidy); Holly Klaft,
Woman Evicted from Federally Subsidized Apartment for Using Medical Maryuana,
JACKSON CITIZEN PATRIOT, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.mlive.com/
news/jackson/index.ssf/201 1/01/womanevicted_from federallys.html (reporting that
private apartment complex in Michigan evicted Section 8 tenant for possession of
marijuana).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2006).
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marijuana users who comply with state law.7 1 Of course, only the DOJ may
criminally prosecute violators of the ban. However, the NEP does not shield
marijuana users from being prosecuted for federal firearms violations. In any
event, even if the DOJ would not criminally prosecute them, some firearms
dealers will not sell to users because the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF) could revoke their federal licenses for doing so. 72
In short, marijuana users face a host of civil sanctions under federal law-
sanctions that hinge on marijuana's continued illegal status under federal law.
These sanctions are enforced mostly by non-DOJ agencies, which are not
obliged to follow the NEP. Indeed, as far as I am aware, only one other
agency-the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-has followed the DOJ's
lead and suspended sanctions against medical users of marijuana. In July 2010,
the VA announced that it would no longer bar patients who use marijuana
legally under state law from receiving pain medications from the VA.73
Otherwise, agencies continue to wage their own battles against medical
marijuana, unhindered by the DOJ-promulgated NEP.
For marijuana users, the civil sanctions just discussed are potentially even
more worrisome than the criminal sanctions actually covered by the NEP. First,
civil enforcement agencies arguably have a much greater capacity to detect
drug use by regulated parties than does the DOJ. The DOT, for example,
regularly subjects safety-sensitive transportation workers to drug tests, 74
making it almost certain that medical marijuana users who fall under its
jurisdiction will be caught and sanctioned. The DOJ's monitoring and
enforcement capacity, by contrast, is quite limited. Even before the NEP, the
DOJ rarely (if ever) criminally prosecuted marijuana users, medical or
otherwise; it simply lacked the resources (including monitoring capacity)
needed to perform the task, and instead, it focused its resources almost
71. See United States v. Stacy, No. 09CR3695 BTM, 2010 WL 4117276, at *6 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that § 922(g)(3) criminalizes possession of firearms, even by
marijuana users who comply with state laws).
72. Scott Mobley, Is it Legal for Medical Marijuana Patients to Buy Guns?, RECORD
SEARCHLIGHT (Feb. 20, 2010), http://www.redding.com/news/2010/feb/20/is-it-legal-for-
medical-marijuana-patients-to/ (reporting that a Redding, California gun dealer refused to
sell firearms to known medical marijuana patients, in order to comply with federal law).
Although the ATF is part of the DOJ, the NEP was not addressed to the Bureau and does not
mention firearms regulations.
73. Dan Frosch, V.A. Easing Rules for Users of Medical Mariuana, N.Y. TIMEs, July
24, 2010, at Al. Even within the VA, however, this is a fairly modest step. The agency, for
example, continues to bar its physicians from recommending marijuana to patients, meaning
that VA patients must seek external medical advice (on their own dime) to take advantage of
state law. Id
74. OFFICE OF DRUG & ALCOHOL POLICY & COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
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exclusively on large-scale marijuana distributors.75 Second, for some users, the
loss of federal privileges can be even more severe than the criminal sanctions
that would typically be imposed if they were actually prosecuted for simple
possession under federal law. Failing a DOT-required drug test, for example,
could end a user's entire career. A conviction for simple possession of
marijuana-though no laughing matter-typically triggers criminal sanctions
that are slight by comparison, such as a short term of probation or a small fine.
In sum, the NEP at most severs only one head of the federal prohibition
hydra. Until there is a change in marijuana's illicit status under federal law,
users of marijuana will face a variety of federal civil sanctions-some far
worse than the criminal sanctions arguably suspended by the NEP.
B. Civil RICO Actions
On top of the sanctions just discussed, marijuana dispensaries could also be
held liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO)
statute. The RICO statute makes it a crime to conduct an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Unlike the CSA, it also creates a civil cause of
action against racketeers and authorizes enforcement by private persons injured
by the racketeering activity.
In this Subpart, I analyze whether such a civil RICO claim could be
brought against a medical marijuana dispensary. On the one hand, I conclude
that a typical dispensary almost certainly commits a substantive RICO
violation. What is more, there are clearly persons who have been injured by
dispensaries' racketeering activity. On the other hand, however, it seems highly
unlikely that any plaintiff would have standing to bring the RICO claim.
Nonetheless, I suggest the threat of civil RICO litigation poses an ongoing
concern for marijuana dispensaries-one that the NEP does nothing to allay.
1. The RICO Cause of Action
The core RICO statute delineates four distinct crimes, but for present
purposes, it suffices to focus on the provision that serves as the basis for most
civil RICO actions: section 1962(c). 7 7 To simplify somewhat, section 1962(c)
75. See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1465; see also Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition
Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555,
560-65 (2010).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
77. The RICO statute, id § 1962, provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity . .. to acquire
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makes it unlawful for a (1) person (2) to conduct (3) an enterprise (4) through a
pattern of racketeering activity.
Consider how each of these elements would apply in a civil action brought
against a marijuana dispensary. Suppose, for the illustration, that the dispensary
is legally incorporated; that it is owned and operated by a single proprietor; and
that it has been feloniously (under the CSA) distributing marijuana to several
customers for at least one year.
a. RICO Person
In a RICO action, the RICO person is the defendant. It can be any
"individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property," 79 though, under section 1962(c), it must be legally distinct from the
RICO enterprise. For purposes of my hypothetical RICO suit, the proprietor
would easily meet all of the legal requirements for being a RICO person. (The
plaintiff's choice of a defendant, of course, would be influenced by a variety of
strategic considerations as well-such as the defendant's wealth-but I leave
those considerations aside for now.)
b. RICO Enterprise
The enterprise named in the suit could be any "individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.',s In my case, the
dispensary-a legal entity-could serve as the RICO enterprise.
c. Conduct
The defendant must also conduct the affairs of the RICO enterprise. In
essence, this means that the defendant must "participate in the operation or
management of the enterprise." 8' Once again, my plucky proprietor clearly
or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
78. E.g., Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing elements of a § 1962(c) claim).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2006).
80. Id. § 1961(4).
81. E.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
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satisfies this test, as she is the sole owner and employee of the dispensary.
d. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Finally, the enterprise must commit a pattern of racketeering activity.
Growing or distributing non-negligible quantities of marijuana clearly
constitutes racketeering activity.82
Committing such crimes repeatedly over the course of a year or more also
constitutes a pattern. Indeed, a pattern may involve as few as two predicate acts,
as long as there is a relationship and continuity in the crimes. In essence, this
means the plaintiff must show the crimes had a common purpose, participants,
or modus operandi, and occurred over a substantial period of time (one year is
enough) or else were likely to recur again in the future.83 In my hypothetical,
distributing marijuana to several customers over the course of a year (or more)
would easily constitute a pattern of racketeering activity.
2. RICO Standing
My hypothetical marijuana dispensary has almost certainly violated section
1962(c). To be sure, the dispensary and its proprietor probably do not need to
worry about criminal RICO liability, because only the DOJ may initiate
criminal RICO prosecutions. Civil RICO liability, however, is another matter.
The RICO statute creates a private cause of action and it empowers anyone
injured by racketeering activity to recover treble damages and attorneys' fees
from defendants. The cause of action is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c):
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of [18 U.S.C.] section 1962 ... may sue therefore in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.84
Importantly, a civil RICO claim is viable even if a defendant is never charged
with nor convicted of the predicate criminal acts.85 This means that the NEP
will not protect dispensaries from civil RICO suits, even if it does protect them
from criminal CSA prosecutions.
The only question remaining is whether any plaintiff could bring a RICO
claim against a marijuana dispensary. Plaintiffs seeking to bring civil RICO
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (2006) (defining racketeering activity, in relevant part, as
the "felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in a controlled substance ... punishable under any law of the United
States").
83. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §
1961(5)).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
85. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1985).
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actions must satisfy onerous standing requirements. Most importantly, for
present purposes, a plaintiff must show that it (1) suffered an injury to its
business or property (2) that was proximately caused by the defendant's
predicate crimes. 86
First, a RICO plaintiff must allege injury to its business or property. This
concept includes harm to any recognized property or business interest, such as
the loss of plaintiffs customers. However, it excludes other sorts of injury,
such as personal injury or harm to a government's sovereign interest.
Second, and more dauntingly, the plaintiff must demonstrate that her injury
was directly caused by the defendant's predicate crimes.88 The Supreme Court
has developed the proximate cause test in a series of recent cases. In Anza v.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., for example, the Court dismissed a civil RICO claim
brought by a company against its (allegedly) tax-evading competitor. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was able to lower its prices and poach the
plaintiffs customers (the injury) by evading state taxes (the racketeering
activity). Yet the Court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the
RICO claim. It reasoned that the state was a more direct victim of the
defendant's tax-evasion scheme. It also foresaw difficulty in ascertaining what
portion of the plaintiffs injury was attributable to the defendant's alleged
predicate crimes, rather than other (legitimate) reasons for the defendant's price
cuts. 89
Similarly, in Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York,90 the Court dismissed
the city's civil RICO claim against an out-of-state online cigarette vendor. The
claim alleged that defendant had failed to report its cigarette sales to state
authorities, as required by state law. This failure constituted mail fraud under
federal law (the racketeering activity) and had allegedly cost the city millions in
lost cigarette tax revenues (the injury). In particular, the city claimed it needed
the sales reports to enforce the city's cigarette tax against the defendant's
customers-importantly, the defendant itself was not required to pay or collect
any taxes on behalf of the city. The Court, however, dismissed the claim on the
ground that the city lacked RICO standing. It reasoned that the state was a more
direct victim of the defendant's mail fraud. It also found that the defendant's
tax-evading customers were a more direct cause of the city's injury.9 1
86. For an excellent synopsis of civil RICO standing, see GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL
RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE (3d ed. 2010).
87. Id. at 42-49 (discussing relevant case law).
88. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (holding that §
1964(c) "demand[ed] . . . some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged"); see also Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006)
("When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must
ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries.").
89. Anza, 547 U.S. at 487-88.
90. 559 U.S. 1 (2010).
9 1. Id.
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The proximate cause requirement clearly limits the universe of actionable
civil RICO claims. In particular, several factors could sever a defendant's legal
responsibility for injuries for which it was an actual (but-for) cause: (1) the
existence of other, intervening causes for the plaintiffs injury; (2) difficulty in
ascertaining the amount of harm attributable to the defendant; (3) a risk of
duplicative recovery against the defendant; and (4) the existence of a more
-92direct victim to bring the claim.
3. The Plaintiff
Given the aforementioned requirements, it is quite possible that no plaintiff
would have standing to bring a civil RICO claim against a medical marijuana
dispensary. Some prospective plaintiffs would not satisfy the first part of the
standing inquiry-suffering an injury to business or property. Consider, briefly,
a suit that might be brought by a local government that opposes medical
marijuana.93 Suppose, for example, that the intrepid Dispensary, Inc., operates
in a socially conservative county situated in a medical marijuana state. Suppose
as well, for sake of argument, that Dispensary's sale of marijuana has fueled a
wave of destructive crime and reckless behavior in the county. In response, the
county has been forced to increase the budget for local law enforcement.
In this scenario, the county has clearly been injured by Dispensary. But its
claim would fail because the county did not suffer an injury to its business or
property. The extra money it had to spend on law enforcement is considered a
94sovereign cost and is not actionable under RICO. In one case, for example, a
local government in Idaho brought a civil RICO action against four companies
that allegedly hired undocumented workers. The county claimed, among other
things, that the influx of undocumented workers had caused it to expend
additional funds on public health and law enforcement. The Ninth Circuit,
however, dismissed the claim, characterizing the injury as one to the
government's regulatory interests and not to its business or property.95
There are, of course, plaintiffs who could allege an injury to business or
property. Imagine, for example, a drug company that has lost customers to a
marijuana dispensary. Marijuana has been hawked as a treatment for ailments
92. See Anza, 547 U.S. at 466; see also JOSEPH, supra note 86, at 53 (listing the myriad
criteria used by courts in determining whether proximate cause exists for civil RICO
purposes).
93. State and local governments are authorized to file claims under civil RICO. E.g.,
Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a state
government may bring a civil RICO claim). Some local governments do not support medical
marijuana laws and have been aggressive in challenging medical marijuana suppliers and the
state laws that protect them. See, e.g., Hoeffel, supra note 19 (discussing the city of
Anaheim's attempt to banish marijuana dispensaries).
94. JOSEPH, supra note 86, at 48-49.
95. Canyon Cnty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2008).
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ranging from glaucoma to cancer-ailments for which patients now spend
billions on patented pharmaceuticals. Many supporters of legalized marijuana
claim it outperforms standard (i.e., legal) drug treatment regimens for these and
many other ailments.96 It seems reasonable to suppose that some patients have
abandoned the drugs marketed by major pharmaceutical corporations and
adopted marijuana as a course of treatment instead.97
To illustrate, suppose that Pharmacology, Inc. hawks a patented medicine
commonly prescribed for treating glaucoma. The medicine costs $30,000
annually. Now suppose that Dispensary, Inc. begins selling marijuana to
Pharmacology's customers, touting it as an alternative glaucoma treatment.
Suppose further that one hundred of Pharmacology's customers stop buying its
glaucoma drug and begin using Dispensary's marijuana instead. The loss of one
hundred customers and associated profits clearly constitutes an injury to
Pharmacology's business or property, for purposes of RICO. Suppose as well
that Dispensary is clearly the actual cause of Pharmacology's loss; in other
words, but for Dispensary's marketing of marijuana, Pharmacology's former
customers would have continued using its lucrative patented medicine.
Even though it might prove that Dispensary's racketeering activity actually
caused it to lose $3 million in revenue (annually), Pharmacology would still
face considerable difficulty satisfying the second prong of the RICO standing
inquiry-showing that Dispensary is the proximate cause of that injury. In my
hypothetical, one could construct a chain of causation that severs Dispensary's
legal responsibility for Pharmacology's loss. For example, Dispensary could
claim that Pharmacology's customers are an intervening cause of its injury.
After all, they were the ones who ultimately decided to defect and use
marijuana in lieu of Pharmacology's drug.99 And those customers might not
96. See, e.g., LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN
MEDICINE, 23-162 (1997) (arguing that marijuana is superior to many drugs that are
currently prescribed for treating a wide range of medical conditions).
97. Id. (discussing stories of patients who stopped taking prescription drugs and started
using marijuana instead).
98. This figure, though high, is quite realistic. On average, brand-name prescription
drugs cost $2,000 annually, and specialty prescription drugs cost $33,000 annually. See Duff
Wilson, Drug Makers Raise Prices in Face of Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2009, at Al; AM. Ass'N RETIRED PERSONS PUB. POL'Y INST., DRUG PRICES CONTINUE TO
CLIMB DESPITE LACK OF GROWTH IN GENERAL INFLATION RATE (2009),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/health-care/i36-watchdog.pdf.
99. A federal district court once used such reasoning to dismiss a similar competitive
injury RICO claim brought by Eli Lilly against the manufacturer of a competing drug. Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998). The court dismissed Lilly's
RICO claim against competitors it alleged had stolen customers by defrauding the FDA into
approving bulk sales of one of Lilly's patent-expired drugs (cefaclor). The court found Lilly
failed to satisfy the proximate cause test, due to the presence of "many intervening acts and
causes," including:
(1) the FDA had to approve ... [defendant's] cefaclor;
(2) [manufacturer defendant] had to manufacture sufficient quantities of bulk cefaclor for
commercial distribution;
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have chosen to defect had their physicians not recommended marijuana in the
first instance.
Considering the aforementioned difficulties, it is hardly surprising that no
drug company has yet brought a RICO action against a dispensary (at least, as
far as I am aware).100 Nonetheless, civil RICO poses a very real threat to
marijuana dispensaries. First, traditional drug firms have a strong (and
growing) financial incentive to combat the medical marijuana movement. The
nation spends $300 billion annually on prescription drugs.'0o Medical
marijuana could eat away at those revenues-current estimates suggest that
California residents alone spend $1.4 billion annually on medical marijuana. It
seems reasonable to suppose that at least some of that money is being diverted
from traditional drug companies. The losses will only widen as more states
legalize medical marijuana-and more citizens turn to marijuana as an
alternative to standard drug regimens.
Second, marijuana dispensaries are becoming an increasingly attractive
target for lawsuits. Although most states appear to limit dispensaries' profit-
making potential, dispensaries are generating substantial returns on
investment.102 These lofty returns have made dispensaries an appealing
investment opportunity for hedge funds.' 03 Not surprisingly, they also make
dispensaries a lucrative target for RICO litigation.
Third, the NEP itself could fuel interest in civil litigation against
marijuana dispensaries. Before the NEP, drug companies may have relied upon
federal criminal sanctions to curb the appeal of marijuana dispensaries and their
penetration into the mainstream market. The federal efforts have not succeeded,
of course, but now that this last porous barrier has (seemingly) been removed,
traditional drug companies might feel pressured to pursue civil litigation to
(3) [wholesaler defendants] had to purchase [defendant's] cefaclor and manufacture retail
dosage units of cefaclor;
(4) pharmacies had to stock the product and doctors had to prescribe [defendant's] generic
cefaclor instead of Lilly's [branded cefaclor]; and
(5) consumers had to decide to purchase finished cefaclor products manufactured by
[defendants] instead of purchasing Lilly's [version].
Id. at 485. See also Barr Labs., Inc. v. Quantum Pharmics, Inc., 827 F. Supp. Ill (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (dismissing RICO claim brought by a generic drug manufacturer against a rival that
stole its customers by defrauding the FDA, because, inter alia, the plaintiffs injuries
"depend[ed] on the intervening actions" of the FDA in approving the rival's drug and its
customers in defecting).
100. On top of the difficulties outlined in the text, a drug company in a real RICO case
would need to trace its losses to particular dispensaries-no easy task, considering that there
are more than seven hundred dispensaries operating in Los Angeles County alone.
101. See Wilson, supra note 98.
102. E.g., Josh Harkinson, Weedmart: Marijuana Superstores. IPOs. Reality TV.,
MOTHER JONES (Jan./Feb. 2011), http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/0 1/wegrow-dhar-
mann-derek-peterson (discussing the marijuana dispensary business).
103. Id. (discussing one fund's one-million dollar investment in the marijuana
business).
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prevent any further erosion of their market share.
Fourth, the proximate cause requirement outlined above-though
daunting-is hardly an insurmountable barrier. In part, this is because
proximate causation is such a notoriously slippery concept. 104 In weighing the
policies served by proximate causation, for example, a district court might
permit Pharmacology's claim against Dispensary to proceed, without obviously
flouting Supreme Court precedent.'0 5 In any event, the Supreme Court could
soften the proximate cause inquiry, or Congress could abrogate the Court's
decisions legislatively, and thereby expose dispensaries to civil RICO actions
(intentionally or not).
In the end, it is impossible to predict precisely how the federal courts
would rule on the RICO standing question, in no small part due to the
flexibility of the proximate cause inquiry. To be sure, a plaintiff would face a
steep uphill battle to satisfy the proximate cause test, meaning a civil RICO suit
is likely to falter, if litigated. However, it is possible that a drug company
aggrieved by losing customers to an illicit rival could successfully bring a civil
RICO claim against a medical marijuana dispensary. And the growing threat
such dispensaries pose to drug company profits suggests someone may soon be
tempted to try.
C. Preemption Challenges Against State Law
Civil RICO actions would target the private dispensaries that currently
supply marijuana pursuant to state law. A second type of civil action would
challenge state medical marijuana laws as preempted by the CSA.
In this Subpart, I consider the viability of a preemption challenge to two
particular types of state law: (1) laws that would create state-run marijuana
dispensaries to cultivate and distribute marijuana; and (2) laws that shield
marijuana users from sanctions imposed by other private citizens. As I explain
below, such laws are likely preempted by the CSA. I also discuss how private
plaintiffs could satisfy standing requirements to bring a preemption cause of
action, assuming that no federal official would do so (on account of the NEP).
104. For a classic statement attesting to the slipperiness of the proximate cause inquiry,
see Palsgrafy. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)
("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of public
policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events
beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.").
105. Under the admittedly stylized facts of my hypothetical, Pharmacology's damages
would be easy to ascertain; the court would only need to multiply its average profit per
customer by the number of customers lost to Dispensary. The risk of duplicative recovery
against Dispensary is also minimal. And no other victim seems more aptly suited to pursue a
civil RICO claim against Dispensary.
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1. The (Implied) Preemption Cause of Action 06
In a previous article, I analyzed the preemptive reach of the CSA in some
depth. 0 7 Here, suffice to say that the CSA preempts state laws that positively
conflict with the federal statute. Such a conflict arises only when a state
engages in, requires, or otherwise aids and abets conduct that violates the
CSA. 0 8 Importantly, the CSA does not (and indeed, could not) preempt state
laws that merely allow residents to cultivate, distribute, or possess marijuana.109
But the CSA likely does preempt two policies now under consideration or
already on the books in some states.
a. State Cultivation/Distribution Programs
To date, states have successfully skirted most preemption challenges by
adopting a purely passive approach to regulating the supply of marijuana. At
most, they merely allow private parties to grow and distribute the drug. They
have not directed state officials to participate in violations of the CSA. This
passive approach is not preempted because the federal government cannot
compel the states to criminalize the cultivation, possession, or distribution of
marijuana by private citizens.
106. Although there is (arguably) no express statutory authorization, it is generally
accepted that an implied right of action exists in federal court to challenge state laws as
preempted. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 721 (6th ed. 2009) (suggesting that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might
authorize preemption challenges, but noting that federal courts have not relied upon that
provision in recognizing an implied right of action); id. (noting a "body of decisions that
routinely permits private parties to sue without express statutory authorization to prevent
state officials from enforcing state laws on the ground that they are preempted by a federal
statute") (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) ("It is beyond dispute
that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with
federal rights.")); id. at 807 ("[T]he rule that there is an implied right of action to enjoin state
or local regulation that is preempted by a federal statutory or constitutional provision-and
that such an action falls within the federal question jurisdiction-is well-established.").
107. Mikos, supra note 1. The CSA includes an express preemption provision:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the
Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to
the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within
the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this
subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.
21 U.S.C. § 903 (2006).
108. See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1451. The CSA's express preemption test can be
restated as follows: "States may not take any action that constitutes a violation of the
substantive provisions of the CSA, nor may they fail to take any action required by the CSA,
so long as that action is required of private citizens and states alike." Id. at 1452.
109. Preempting exemptions from state-imposed sanctions would, in effect, compel the
states to enact a ban on medical marijuana-a clear violation of the Court's anti-
commandeering rule. See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1453-55 (providing a more extensive
discussion of the limits of Congress's power to preempt state law).
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Some states, however, are proposing to assert direct control over the supply
of medical marijuana. Under one type of proposal, introduced in Colorado,
New Jersey, New Mexico, and Oregon, a state agency would grow and/or
distribute marijuana directly to qualified patients, essentially replacing private
dispensaries. 0 Under a second proposal, introduced in Maine and Vermont,
state law enforcement agents would redistribute marijuana seized from drug
dealers through state-operated or licensed dispensaries."'
No state has yet created a state dispensary, but it appears the NEP has
rekindled interest in such plans.12 Before the NEP, it appears some states were
deterred from opening state dispensaries by the threat of incurring federal
criminal liability. In 2007, for example, New Mexico scuttled plans for a state-
run marijuana farm and dispensary, at least in part out of concerns that its
employees could be criminally prosecuted by the federal government."' Not
surprisingly, the NEP has seemingly assuaged such concerns. In fact, in the
110. Mikos, supra note 1, at 1432 (discussing the New Mexico proposal); Tracy Loew,
State May Take Over Growing Medical Pot, STATESMAN J., Mar. 12, 2009, at C3 (discussing
the Oregon proposal); Richard Perez-Pena, New Jersey's Medical Marituana Law Loses
Planned Grower and Dispensers, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, at A 15 (discussing Governor
Christie's proposal to have Rutgers University grow marijuana for state medical marijuana
program); David 0. Williams, White Wants State of Colorado to Go into the Weed Business,
COLO. INDEP. (Nov. 6, 2009), http://coloradoindependent.com/41680/white-wants-state-of-
colorado-to-go-into-the-weed-business (discussing Colorado lawmaker's proposal to create
and operate a state marijuana cultivation/distribution facility for medical marijuana patients).
In addition, at least two states have recently launched studies on whether to establish state
marijuana dispensaries. H.R. Con. Res. 141, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009) ("BE IT
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives of the Twenty-fifth Legislature of the State of
Hawaii, Regular Session of 2009, the Senate concurring, that the Legislative Reference
Bureau is requested to study the issue of establishing a state facility to grow and distribute
marijuana for medical use in Hawaii . . . ."); H.B. 648, 2009 Sess. (N.H. 2009) (proposing to
legalize medical marijuana and establishing a committee to study whether and how a state
agency should be "authorized to cultivate and dispense marijuana" for medical purposes).
What is more, Washington state legislators have proposed legalizing marijuana outright and
selling the drug through state liquor stores. An Act Relating to Marijuana, H.B. 2401, 61st
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-
10/Pdf/Bills/House%2OBills/2401.pdf.
111. An Act Relating to Providing Medical Marijuana Through State-Licensed Liquor
Stores, H.B. 651, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009):
This bill proposes to permit the state to distribute marijuana seized in criminal cases to
registered medical marijuana patients. The department of public safety would test marijuana
in its possession and provide untainted marijuana to the department of liquor control. The
department of liquor control would regulate the distribution of the medical marijuana through
establishments that hold a state-issued second class liquor license. Only persons who are
registered patients pursuant to chapter 86 of Title 18 would be eligible to purchase the
medical marijuana.
See also Mikos, supra note 1, at 1432 (discussing the Maine proposal).
112. See, e.g., Kris Olson, Former Federal Prosecutor Says 'Yes' To Measure 74,
VOTERS' PAMPHLET (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22010/guide/
m74_fav.html (statement of former U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon suggesting the
NEP has opened the door for Oregon to regulate the supply of medical marijuana).
113. Mikos, supra note 1, at 1432.
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wake of the NEP announcement, lawmakers in at least two states-Colorado
and Oregon-proposed legislation to create state dispensaries, and lawmakers
in two more states-Hawaii and New Hampshire-commenced studies to
examine the option.'14
Giving the state direct control-and perhaps even a monopoly-over the
supply of medical marijuana has obvious advantages. The state could more
easily prevent diversion of medical marijuana, and state police could more
easily distinguish legal from illegal sales, if the state held exclusive license to
grow and/or distribute the drug. Cash-strapped states could also generate new
revenues by monopolizing the lucrative market for medical marijuana." 5
Indeed, many states employed a similar tactic to control and profit from the sale
of alcohol following the repeal of Prohibition in the 1930s.116 Even today, a
handful of states continue to operate state liquor stores.
The problem is that state dispensaries are clearly preempted by the CSA.
State agents may look askance when private citizens grow, distribute, or
possess marijuana. However, they may not grow, distribute, or possess
marijuana themselves-doing so creates a positive conflict with the CSA." 7
Since the states would directly engage in action proscribed by federal law, and
not merely tolerate the actions of others (e.g., private dispensaries), preemption
of these programs does not raise the commandeering concerns noted above.
This means that federal and state courts could enjoin state agents from growing
or distributing marijuana. (This assumes, of course, that a proper plaintiff raises
the claim-but more on that issue below.)
In short, if a state were to participate directly in the supply of marijuana-
by growing, distributing, redistributing, or even subsidizing" 8 purchases of the
114. The Hawaii legislature left little doubt that the NEP had bolstered interest in state
dispensaries. On March 17, 2009, just days following Attorney General Holder's initial
announcement of the NEP, the state legislature directed a state agency to look into creating a
state marijuana cultivation/distribution program. H.R. Con. Res. 141. The resolution calling
for the study was accompanied by another resolution lauding Holder's announcement and
urging federal law enforcement officials to comply. H.R. Con. Res. 165, 25th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Haw. 2009).
115. See Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other
Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223 (discussing how state ownership of dispensaries
would bolster tax collections).
116. See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation:
Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 MILBANK Q. 461, 473-82 (1991)
(discussing how states owned retail distribution outlets as a means of controlling alcohol
upon Prohibition's demise).
117. Mikos, supra note 1, at 1457-59 ("State cultivation and distribution of marijuana
constitutes a departure from the state of nature. Though marijuana is available in the state of
nature, the state distribution program would arguably provide something unique--a safe,
cheap, consistent, and reliable supply of marijuana. Moreover, the CSA explicitly bars the
cultivation and distribution of marijuana, leaving little doubt that Congress intended to
preempt such state programs.").
118. Some states are considering subsidizing marijuana for low-income residents. A
recent Oregon ballot initiative, for example, would have created a state-funded program to
659
HeinOnline  -- 22 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 659 2011
STANFORD LAW& POLICY REVIEW
drug-its program could be challenged as preempted and enjoined.
b. State Shields Against Private Sanctions
A second type of state law could likewise be found preempted and
enjoined. This type of law attempts to shield marijuana growers, distributors,
users, and their associates from sanctions imposed by private parties:
Some states, for example, bar private hospitals and clinics from taking
adverse action (such as denying privileges) against any physician who
recommends marijuana to a patient. Some states also bar landlords
from terminating the lease of any qualified patient, caregiver, or
supplier for possessing, usin , or growing marijuana on rental property
in accordance with state law. 9
To the extent state agents aid and abet CSA violations by enforcing such
laws, the laws are preempted.120 Under federal law, aiding and abetting
requires: "(1) committing an overt act that assists the crime (the actus reus), (2)
and having the specific intent of facilitating the crime of another (the mens
rea)."l2 1 Most courts hold that even trivial assistance satisfies the overt act
requirement. For example, it seems reasonable to suppose that a judge who
orders a landlord to reinstate a tenant evicted for growing marijuana has
committed an overt act that assists the tenant's crime of marijuana
cultivation.122
The mens rea requirement, however, presents a closer question. It boils
down to the purpose motivating the state's protection of dispensaries and
marijuana users. In our hypothetical, the litigant claiming preemption (i.e., the
landlord) must show that the state ordered reinstatement out of a desire to help
the tenant cultivate marijuana. This would be the case, for example, if the state
policy was designed to ensure adequate supplies of marijuana for qualified
patients. If, however, the state merely sought to protect vulnerable residents
from being evicted from their homes, the law would probably stand; in this
case, one could say that the state acted in spite of its impact on marijuana use
and not because of it.123
assist low-income residents in obtaining marijuana for medical purposes from private
dispensaries. The proposal was included as part of Measure 74, a ballot initiative that was
rejected in the November 2010 election. The Oregon Regulated Medical Marituana Supply
System, VOTERS' PAMPHLET, Nov. 2, 2010, at § 4.
119. Mikos, supra note 1, at 1456.
120. Id. at 1456-57.
121. Id. at 1452 (citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991)
("The crime of aiding and abetting requires knowledge of the illegal activity that is being
aided and abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed, and some act of helping.").
122. Mikos, supra note 1, at 1457.
123. The Supreme Court of Oregon has recently ruled that a state law shielding
medical marijuana users from employment discrimination is, in fact, preempted by the CSA.
Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or. 2010).
Although the Oregon court's conclusion may be correct, it rested its decision on the
660 [Vol. 22:2
HeinOnline  -- 22 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 660 2011
2011] MEDICAL MARIJUANA NON-ENFORCEMENT POLICY
In sum, federal law seemingly authorizes suits challenging state medical
marijuana laws as preempted. What is more, at least with respect to the two
state laws considered herein, the challenges should probably prevail: a state
marijuana cultivation/distribution operation is clearly preempted by the CSA
and state tenant/employee protection laws are arguably preempted as well. As
such, these laws could be enjoined.
2. Preemption Standing
Even if a meritorious preemption cause of action exists, however, it is
possible that no plaintiff would have standing to challenge state law in federal
court-especially if the federal government (per the NEP) refuses to do so. To
assert standing in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate: "(1) a distinct and
palpable injury to himself; (2) that this injury is caused by the challenged
activity; and (3) that this injury is apt to be redressed by a remedy that the court
is prepared to give."l 2 4 I consider who (if anyone) could satisfy these
requirements in order to challenge: (1) a state cultivation/distribution operation;
and (2) state protection against private sanctions.
a. State Cultivation/Distribution Operation
Although a state marijuana dispensary would clearly be preempted by
federal law, it is doubtful whether any plaintiff other than the federal
government would have standing to bring suit and enjoin its operation in
federal court. The key barrier to standing in such a case would be the injury-in-
fact requirement. The plaintiff would need to demonstrate a distinctive injury
caused by the state program. In other words, she must have some interest
beyond that of ensuring her state government complies with federal law-an
interest shared by her state's entire population. In addition, her injury must be
imminent and not merely speculative. Though she need not have already
suffered the injury, the threat of it must be sufficiently grave.
The number of persons who would plausibly meet the injury-in-fact
requirements is quite slim. Start with an ordinary citizen. Every citizen has an
interest in ensuring that her state government obeys the law. Yet that interest,
standing alone, is not particularized enough to enable a citizen to claim that a
state law is preempted by federal law, at least not in federal court. In most
situations, the federal courts reject citizen standing.125 A suit brought by a
mistaken proposition that a state could never "authorize" violations of federal law. See
Mikos, supra note 1, at 1451 (explaining that states may permit-authorize, license, allow,
etc. -activity Congress proscribes, as long as they do not also facilitate such activity).
124. 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.4 (3d ed. 1998) (elaborating upon standing requirements).
125. See id. § 3531.10 ("[N]either citizens nor taxpayers can appear in court simply to
insist that the government and its officials adhere to the requirements of law.").
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citizen on no more grounds than her status as such (or, similarly, her status as a
taxpayer) would be dismissed.
There is one plaintiff who would face a more distinct injury due to the
operation of a state dispensary: a state employee who is required by law to
cultivate and/or distribute marijuana. In theory, this person could be subjected
to federal prosecution and federal sanctions simply for doing her job. After all,
she would be violating federal criminal law by participating in the program.
There is no immunity for a state employee who operates a state marijuana
dispensary.126 The threat of criminal sanctions constitutes a particularized
injury, sufficiently distinct from the generalized grievance shared by ordinary
citizens.
Nonetheless, even this employee would probably lack standing, due to a
second requirement under the injury-in-fact test. Although the employee's
injury is sufficiently particularized, it would probably be considered too
speculative to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.127 The employee does not
have to be under arrest or facing indictment to challenge the state statute.128 But
she must face a reasonable threat of prosecution to satisfy the injury-in-fact
inquiry. Typically, this requires some indicia that the government is
considering prosecution, such as an explicit threat from government agents or a
history of government prosecutions in similar situations.129 The mere
possibility that one could be prosecuted, standing alone, is not enough.
In light of the NEP, it would be difficult to establish a reasonable threat of
prosecution for cultivating/distributing marijuana pursuant to state law. In the
context of medical marijuana, the federal government has given no indication
that it would actually pursue legal action against a state cultivation/distribution
operation. In fact, it has suggested (albeit in an equivocal way) just the
opposite: that it would decline to prosecute anyone who cultivates/distributes
marijuana in compliance with state law. Hence, it seems unlikely that even a
state official who is obligated by state law to violate the CSA would have
standing to challenge the state law as preempted.130
Despite the roadblocks in federal court, there remains the possibility that
126. See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1457-59 (discussing the limits of the immunity
conferred by 21 U.S.C. § 885(d)).
127. In the alternative, one might say that the injury is not yet ripe.
128. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (declining to require that a plaintiff
violate a city ordinance before challenging the law).
129. See id. at 459 (finding that the plaintiff satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement
because he had been warned by police that he would be prosecuted if he distributed handbills
and the police had, in fact, already prosecuted someone else under the ordinance).
130. A state official could try to recast the injury as being forced to disobey the law, as
opposed to being punished for disobeying the law. This might satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement, though I am aware of no plaintiff who has (successfully or not) cast an injury in
such terms. In any event, it would be a very limited universe of persons who would have
standing to raise the preemption claim under this theory or the one discussed in the text, and
it is quite possible that no state agent would even want to sue in the first instance.
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plaintiffs could pursue their preemption causes of action in state courts instead.
State courts are not bound by Article III or the Supreme Court's rulings
limiting access to the federal courts.131 In general, persons without an obvious,
immediate stake in litigation have a much easier time challenging state laws in
state court than in federal court.132 First, almost every state court allows
taxpayers to challenge public expenditures "without any individual or
particularized showing of injury in fact, and sometimes without even a showing
that the expenditure will affect their tax burdens."' 33 This permissive standing
rule "empowers citizens, in their capacity as taxpayers, to counter the illegal
expenditure of tax revenues and other threats to the public fisc."' 34 Second, "[a]
number of states go further and provide, either by constitutional provision,
court-made rule, or legislation, for broad, general citizen standing to raise
issues of great importance and interest to the public."l 35 Third, many state
courts grant state lawmakers standing to challenge state laws before they take
effect.136 Federal courts, by contrast, reject the claim that lawmakers have any
special stake in ensuring the legality of their handiwork; such lawmakers must
satisfy the same onerous standing requirements as everyone else.' 37
These permissive standing rules virtually ensure that opponents could
mount a challenge to state dispensaries in state courts, even if they could not
necessarily do so in federal court. In California, for example, state law
authorizes taxpayer suits to enjoin the illegal expenditure of funds by local
governments.138 Suppose the city of Oakland passes a new ordinance
131. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 106, at 126.
132. E.g., John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
437, 460 (2002) ("[S]tate courts tend to be more hospitable [than federal courts] to the
raising of constitutional claims whether by private individuals and groups or by government
officials."); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J.
1003, 1006 (2001) ("State courts do not run 'public interest' and other ideological plaintiffs
through the obstacle course erected by the U.S. Supreme Court under the guise of Article III.
Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, unfettered by constitutional provisions
analogous to Article Ill.").
133. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the 'Passive Virtues': Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1854 (2001); see also Elmendorf, supra note 132, at
1007 ("Every state except New Mexico recognizes taxpayer standing; some even authorize
taxpayer challenges to nonfiscal matters .... ).
134. Elmendorf, supra note 132, at 1007.
135. Reitz, supra note 132, at 459; see also Hershkoff, supra note 133, at 1856 (noting
that "courts in some states allow broad citizen standing").
136. See Hershkoff, supra note 133, at 1857 ("State courts also afford legislators an
opportunity to test the constitutionality of legislation after its enactment, but before
enforcement begins.").
137. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 106, at 122-23 (discussing legislator standing);
Hershkoff, supra note 133, at 1853-54 ("[E]lected representatives typically lack standing [in
federal court] to challenge government action, unless they can demonstrate injury to
themselves as individuals.").
138. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 2010) ("An action to obtain a judgment,
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establishing a city-owned and operated marijuana dispensary.139 Under state
law, any Oakland taxpayer could sue to enjoin the dispensary, on the grounds
that (1) it violates federal law by distributing marijuana and (2) city officials
are illegally expending city funds by operating it. Indeed, even if the dispensary
became self-sufficient or contributed positively to Oakland's finances (through
user fees, etc.), the program could be enjoined.140
In short, a state court could do what a federal court might not: it could
reach the merits of a preemption challenge to a state marijuana dispensary
program. Given that such a program would be illegal under federal law, the
court would (presumably) find it preempted and enjoin its operation.141
b. State Employee/Tenant Protection Laws
It would be far easier to find a plaintiff who would have standing in federal
court to challenge state laws protecting tenants and employees from eviction
and employment sanctions. In particular, any employer sued for terminating a
marijuana-using employee clearly suffers a particularized and immediate
injury: the need to defend against the suit and (likely) pay damages under state
law.142 Likewise, a landlord who is sued for evicting a marijuana-growing
tenant faces a similarly distinct and immediate injury. Standing would pose no
obstacle to raising the preemption claims brought by these parties.
restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of.. . funds . .. of a county, town, city or
city and county of the state, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or
other person, acting in its behalf, either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who
is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the
action, has paid, a tax therein.").
139. Oakland has stopped just short of doing this. The Oakland City Council recently
licensed four industrial-sized medical marijuana dispensaries. Malia Wollan, Oakland,
Seeking Financial Lift, Approves Giant Marituana Farms, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at
A 18. Unlike government-operated dispensaries, however, government-licensed dispensaries
are not necessarily considered state actors and thus might not be preempted by the CSA. See
Mikos, supra note 1, at 1481 n.21 1 (discussing relevant case law).
140. Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242, 1249 (Cal. 1971) (explaining how state courts
have interpreted section 526a liberally to "'enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge
government action' (quoting Comment, Taxpayers'Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE
L.J. 895, 904 (1960))). As a fallback, any state official required by law to operate the
dispensary would have standing to challenge the program as preempted. E.g., City of Garden
Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the city police
have standing to challenge as preempted a state law requiring them to return marijuana
seized from qualified medical marijuana patients).
141. 1 say presumably because the California state courts have, thus far, failed to
properly analyze the preemptive impact of the CSA on the state's medical marijuana laws.
See Mikos, supra note 1, at 1442 n.89 (discussing and critiquing preemption analysis in state
cases).
142. Cf Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (granting standing to
employer-airline that sought to challenge state pregnancy discrimination law as preempted
under ERISA).
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To recap, some state medical marijuana laws could be blocked as a result
of the federal ban, even if the federal government itself disavows interest in
enforcing it criminally. While this preemption threat is fairly narrow-only
laws that require state agents to violate the CSA are preempted by it-it could
derail important measures that some states are now considering to augment
their core medical marijuana exemptions. The viability of preemption
lawsuits-and thus, the reforms they challenge-would be unaffected by the
NEP. Instead, whether plaintiffs could proceed would depend entirely upon
standing doctrines in state and federal courts-doctrines that will not likely
prevent the preemption issue from being litigated.
CONCLUSION
In many respects, the NEP is an empty gesture. It does not necessarily
prevent medical marijuana users or dispensaries from being criminally
prosecuted, even if they comply with state law. No court would enforce the
NEP, and even the DOJ cannot guarantee compliance. Nor does the NEP
remove the threat of civil sanctions against medical marijuana users and
dispensaries. Federal agencies outside of the DOJ's control can still strip
marijuana users of valuable federal benefits, drug companies could still pursue
civil RICO claims against dispensaries in federal court, and private citizens
could still initiate preemption challenges to enjoin certain state laws and
impose their own brand of justice on marijuana users and suppliers.
One could say that, if the goal of the NEP is to economize federal law
enforcement resources, the mission has been accomplished. The NEP has
probably reduced the number of medical marijuana cases brought, even if it has
not eliminated them entirely. The gains of such a policy shift, however, hardly
seem noteworthy. Medical marijuana cases probably consumed no more than a
sliver of the DOJ's budget, even at the heights of enforcement. Even a more
drastic cut in enforcement actions against medical marijuana seems unlikely to
change the landscape of federal criminal law.
However, if the goal was to empower states to regulate medical marijuana
according to local preferences-and to grant reprieve to patients and
dispensaries operating pursuant to state law-the NEP falls far short. Federal
law continues to impede the development of rational state medical marijuana
programs. Users, suppliers, and caregivers remain vulnerable to a host of
federal civil sanctions and private sanctions against which the states are
currently unable to provide shelter.
Not surprisingly, the Obama Administration would have been more
successful had it simply legalized medical marijuana. 14 In fact, the CSA
143. By most accounts, President Obama has shown little interest in doing so. See, e.g.,
Kreit, supra note 75, at 561 (discussing President Obama's reluctance to reschedule
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authorizes the Attorney General to do so, in consultation with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the DEA. 14 4 In other words, the President
would not need the consent of Congress to make this more fundamental change
to federal law.
Such a move would sever the many heads of the prohibition hydra.
Marijuana would be put on par with other medications-it would be legal, but
controlled. Civil sanctions would no longer flow solely from the drug's illicit
status. Civil RICO claims predicated on the distribution of medical marijuana
would be dismissed even more readily. Preemption challenges would no longer
threaten legal protections for marijuana users and dispensaries or derail
proposed reforms designed to enhance state control over the medical marijuana
trade. And DOJ officials could no longer prosecute medical marijuana users
and dispensaries, regardless of where they lived in the country.
I remain agnostic on the ultimate question of whether this drug should be
made legal. I am convinced, however, that the present system of regulation-
combining a confusing and conflicting set of rules-is seriously flawed. The
NEP, unfortunately, has not improved that assessment.
marijuana).
144. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2006).
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APPENDIX
October 19, 2009
MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
FROM: David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General
SUBJECT: Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical
Use of Marijuana
This memorandum provides clarification and guidance to federal
prosecutors in States that have enacted laws authorizing the medical use of
marijuana. These laws vary in their substantive provisions and in the extent of
state regulatory oversight, both among the enacting States and among local
jurisdictions within those States. Rather than developing different guidelines
for every possible variant of state and local law, this memorandum provides
uniform guidance to focus federal investigations and prosecutions in these
States on core federal enforcement priorities.
The Department of Justice is committed to the enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act in all States. Congress has determined that
marijuana is a dangerous drug, and the illegal distribution and sale of marijuana
is a serious crime and provides a significant source of revenue to large-scale
criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels. One timely example underscores the
importance of our efforts to prosecute significant marijuana traffickers:
marijuana distribution in the United States remains the single largest source of
revenue for the Mexican cartels.
The Department is also committed to making efficient and rational use of
its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources. In general, United States
Attorneys are vested with "plenary authority with regard to federal criminal
matters" within their districts. USAM 9-2.001. In exercising this authority,
United States Attorneys are "invested by statute and delegation from the
Attorney General with the broadest discretion in the exercise of such
authority." Id. This authority should, of course, be exercised consistent with
Department priorities and guidance.
The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including
marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking
networks continues to be a core priority in the Department's efforts against
narcotics and dangerous drugs, and the Department's investigative and
prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these objectives. As a
general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in
your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous
compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.
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For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses
who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with
applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance
with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely
to be an efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand,
prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell
marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of the Department.
To be sure, claims of compliance with state or local law may mask operations
inconsistent with the terms, conditions, or purposes of those laws, and federal
law enforcement should not be deterred by such assertions when otherwise
pursuing the Department's core enforcement priorities.
Typically, when any of the following characteristics is present, the conduct
will not be in clear and unambiguous compliance with applicable state law and
may indicate illegal drug trafficking activity of potential federal interest:
* unlawful possession or unlawful use of firearms;
* violence;
* sales to minors;
* financial and marketing activities inconsistent with the terms, conditions,
or purposes of state law, including evidence of money laundering activity
and/or financial gains or excessive amounts of cash inconsistent with
purported compliance with state or local law;
* amounts of marijuana inconsistent with purported compliance with state
or local law;
* illegal possession or sale of other controlled substances; or
* ties to other criminal enterprises.
Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law, and the list of
factors above is not intended to describe exhaustively when a federal
prosecution may be warranted. Accordingly, in prosecutions under the
Controlled Substances Act, federal prosecutors are not expected to charge,
prove, or otherwise establish any state law violations. Indeed, this
memorandum does not alter in any way the Department's authority to enforce
federal law, including laws prohibiting the manufacture, production,
distribution, possession, or use of marijuana on federal property. This guidance
regarding resource allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal
defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any privileges,
benefits, or rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any individual,
party or witness in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. Nor does clear
and unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the
above factors create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances
Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of
investigative and prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution where there
is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with state law is being invoked
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as a pretext for the production or distribution of marijuana for purposes not
authorized by state law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or
prosecution, even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or
prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests.
Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for prosecution on
a case-by-case basis, consistent with the guidance on resource allocation and
federal priorities set forth herein, the consideration of requests for federal
assistance from state and local law enforcement authorities, and the Principles
of Federal Prosecution.
cc: All United States Attorneys
Lanny A. Breuer
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